Here's a summary incase anyone is looking for more info:
Initial Access:
KadNap gains initial access via credential stuffing against SSH or ASUS router administrative web interfaces—no specific CVE exploitation has been confirmed.
The following Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) have been identified:
Malicious Script: aic.sh downloaded from 212.104.141[.]140
Malware Binary: kad (ELF file) stored in /jffs/.asusrouter
C2 & Peer Nodes:
45.135.180.38
45.135.180.177
Command-and-Control (C2) Infrastructure:
212.104.141[.]140 (primary staging host)
Additional Files:
fwr.sh
/tmp/.sose
Key Behaviors:
Establishes hourly cron job persistence.
Blocks SSH port 22 to prevent remediation.
Uses a custom Kademlia DHT protocol to hide C2 infrastructure.
Communicates via peer-to-peer (P2P) network to evade detection.
Remediation:
Perform a hard factory reset on the ASUS router.
Update to the latest firmware.
Disable remote management on the WAN interface.
Change default admin credentials.
Monitor for unusual outbound traffic.
Lumen Technologies has blocked traffic to the C2 infrastructure for its customers and shared IOCs publicly via GitHub for broader defense.
KadNap Botnet: Kademlia DHT C2 Evasion on ASUS Edge Devices Analysis of a P2P Router Botnet Powering the Doppelgänger Criminal Proxy Service Classification: Executive Brief Date: March 11, 202…
labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org
AGAIN, lesson for those to make sure you've hardened your perimeter. Don't expose SSH or web admin access to the internet. Exposed services are the Achilles heel to many of these compromises.